TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preliminary Statement of Method and Scope

Table of Juridical Distinctions and Definitions

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Part I: Office and Person

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Question I 
 Whether the Papacy is a juridical being distinct from the person of the Roman Pontiff.

Question II 
 Whether an ecclesiastical office can cease to exist without the extinction of the person who held it.

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Part II: On Vacancy

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Question III 
 Whether vacancy in canon law is a univocal juridical condition or an analogical one.

Question IV 
 Whether vacancy of the Roman See and of the Apostolic See are the same juridical reality in canon law.

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Part III: On Competence

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Question V 
 Whether constitutive juridical competence can arise from necessity, presupposition, or the effects of an act.

Question VI
 Whether invalidating law closes the field of juridical competence.

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Part IV: On Succession

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Question VII
 Whether juridical succession always follows the vacancy of an ecclesiastical office.

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Part V: On the Rule of Interpretation

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Question VIII 
 How special law governing papal election must be understood in light of the juridical ontology.

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Interposed Ontological Conclusion

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Part VI: Application to the Law of Papal Election

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Question IX 
 Whether the special law governing the election of the Roman Pontiff instantiates electoral competence only in the case of death.

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General Conclusion

 

Epilogue: On the Custodial Status of the Apostolic See

 

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TABLE OF JURIDICAL DISTINCTIONS AND DEFINITIONS

 

I. Fundamental Modes of Juridical Being

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D1. Canon Law

Canon law is a system of binding juridical norms constituted by competent authority and promulgated in text, binding according to their terms and producing determinate juridical effects, including nullity where so provided. Its binding force arises from ordinatio rationis exercised by a competent legislator, not from outcomes, acceptance, or necessity.

 

D2. Juridical Person

A juridical or physical person is the subject capable of bearing rights, duties, and offices in law. The person persists across distinct juridical states (e.g., reigning officeholder, resigned former officeholder, deceased predecessor).

 

D3. Ecclesiastical Office (munus)

An ecclesiastical office is a constituted juridical reality distinct from the person who holds it, capable of juridical acquisition and juridical cessation. Offices exist or cease to exist by juridical acts defined by law.

 

II. Person, Office, and Mode of Holding

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D4. Person-Office Distinction

Canon law distinguishes between: the person who holds an office, and the office as a juridical reality. Termination of the office does not imply termination of the person.

 

D5. Mode of Holding Office

The mode by which an office is held (active possession, resigned former holder, deceased former holder) is juridically distinct from both the person and the office itself. Persistence of the person across modes does not imply continuity of office.

 

III. The Two Sees As Distinct Juridical Objects

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D6. Roman See (Sedes Romana)

The Roman See is the episcopal office of the Bishop of Rome considered as a personal ecclesiastical office. Governed with respect to resignation by canon 332 §2. Vacated by valid renunciation of the munus.

 

D7. Apostolic See (Sedes Apostolica)

The Apostolic See is a composite juridical subject comprising: the Roman Pontiff, and the offices and institutions through which supreme governance of the Church is exercised (cf. c. 361). It is not identical with the Roman See, though related to it.

 

D8. Juridical State and Non-Identity of the Two Sees 

A juridical state (status iuridicus) is a legally constituted condition in which a subject, office, or object exists, by which the law determines which norms apply and which competences are activated or withheld.

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Thus, vacancy of the Roman See does not, by itself, juridically instantiate the vacancy of the Apostolic See in every juridically relevant sense. Distinct juridical objects may enter distinct juridical states upon the same factual event, and distinct laws may attach distinct effects to each, depending upon the juridical object governed and the competence expressly conferred by law.

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IV. Vacancy As An Analogical Juridical Condition

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D9. Vacancy

Vacancy is an analogical juridical concept. Its specific legal effects are determined not by the term itself, but by the law governing the juridical object vacated and the juridical state thereby constituted.

 

D10. Office-Vacancy

Office-vacancy is the juridical condition in which an ecclesiastical office lacks a personal holder. Example: vacancy of the Roman See following resignation under canon 332 §2.

 

D11. Death-Conditioned Vacancy of the Apostolic See

Death-conditioned vacancy of the Apostolic See is the juridical state arising from the death of the officeholder, producing extinction of personal vicarious authority and triggering succession mechanisms where so provided by special law.

 

D12. Custodial Status of the Apostolic See (Status Custodiae Apostolicae)

A custodial vacancy is a juridical state in which governance is restrained (nihil innovetur) and whose legal effects are limited to conservation unless and until succession is positively required by law.

 

V. Juridical Competence

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D13. Constitutive Competence (Potestas Constituens)

Constitutive competence is the juridical authority to bring an office or juridical reality into existence. It must be positively conferred by law. It cannot be supplied by necessity, intention, presupposition, or acceptance.

 

D14. Executive or Governing Power

Executive (governing) power is the authority to act within an already-existing juridical framework. It presupposes an existing office and cannot substitute for constitutive competence.

 

VI. Invalidating Law And Non-Being

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D15. Invalidating Law (Lex Irritans)

An invalidating law is a juridical norm that expressly renders an act null ipso iure when its conditions are not fulfilled (c. 10). A null act is non-being in law and produces no juridical effects.

 

D16. Constitutive Nullity

Constitutive nullity arises where a constitutive act is attempted without the required competence or conditions. Such nullity is not a defect to be healed but the absence of juridical existence. 

 

In speaking of juridical non-being, this Disputation does not conflate legal being with substantial being, but presupposes their Thomistic distinction, arguing only that juridical acts must conform to the substantial realities upon which the law itself predicates their competence.

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VII. Closed Field Of Constitutive Law

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D17. Closed Juridical Field

In matters governed by invalidating law and constitutive competence, the juridical field is closed: what the law expressly provides is permitted; what it does not provide is withheld. Silence does not confer discretion or authority.

 

D18. Limits of Interpretation and Equity

Interpretation, equity (epikeia), necessity, and reception cannot supply constitutive competence where the law has not conferred it. Such considerations may operate only where the law already grants authority.

 

VIII. Succession

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D19. Succession

Succession is the juridical replacement of a prior officeholder following a vacancy identified by law as succession-triggering. Succession is a distinct juridical object, not a reflex of vacancy as such.

 

D20. Non-Identity of Vacancy and Succession

Not every vacancy necessitates succession.
— Succession arises only where the law positively identifies a vacancy state as requiring and authorizing replacement.

 

 

PART I: OFFICE AND PERSON

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QUESTION I

Whether the Papacy is a juridical being distinct from the person of the Roman Pontiff.

 

Objection 1
It seems that the papacy is not distinct from the person, because canon law repeatedly speaks of “the Roman Pontiff” as a single subject of supreme power. Therefore, where the person exists, the papacy exists.

 

Objection 2
Further, the papacy is conferred upon a man, not upon an abstraction. Therefore, it appears that the papacy exists only insofar as the person exists, and is not a distinct juridical reality.

 

Objection 3
Further, if the papacy were distinct from the person, it could exist without a person, which is absurd. Therefore, the papacy must be identical with the person who holds it.

 

On the Contrary

Canon law explicitly regulates the cessation of the papal office by juridical act without reference to the extinction of the person (c. 332 §2). But that which can cease while its subject remains must be distinct in being from that subject. Therefore, the papacy is not identical with the person of the Roman Pontiff.

 

I Respond that

It must be said that the papacy is a juridical being distinct from the person of the Roman Pontiff.

For in canon law, an ecclesiastical office (officium, munus) is constituted as a juridical reality, not as a mere description of personal authority. An office is that which is acquired, held, and lost according to law, and whose existence is governed by juridical norms rather than by biological or psychological facts.

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The person, by contrast, is a physical subject capable of bearing offices, rights, and duties, but whose existence is not constituted by law and does not terminate by juridical act.

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This distinction is not philosophical speculation but juridical necessity. For canon law regulates: the acquisition of offices, the exercise of offices, and the cessation of offices, while presupposing the continuous existence of the person across these changes.

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Accordingly, when canon law provides that the Roman Pontiff may renounce his munus freely and properly manifested, without acceptance (c. 332 §2), it effects the cessation of the papal office while the person remains alive and juridically capable of bearing other statuses. This would be impossible unless the papacy were something other than the person himself.

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Therefore, the papacy exists as a juridical reality inhering in, but not identical with, the person. The person is the subject in quo the office exists while held, but the office itself is constituted, delimited, and terminated by law.

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This distinction preserves the coherence of canon law by allowing: continuity of the person through different juridical states, termination of office without extinction of the subject, and precise regulation of authority without recourse to metaphysical confusion.

 

Hence, the papacy is an ens iuridicum distinct from the person of the Roman Pontiff.

 

Reply to Objection 1

To the first objection it must be said that canon law speaks of “the Roman Pontiff” as a juridical subject exercising supreme authority by virtue of office, not as a bare person. Linguistic unity does not imply ontological identity. The same term may denote the person-as-officeholder without collapsing the distinction between person and office.

 

Reply to Objection 2

To the second objection it must be said that although the papacy is conferred upon a man, it is not thereby identical with him. Many offices are conferred upon persons without being reducible to them. Conferral presupposes distinction: that which is given is not identical with that which receives.

 

Reply to Objection 3

To the third objection it must be said that the papacy cannot exist without a person actually holding it, but it can cease to exist while the person remains. This is sufficient to establish real distinction. Dependence for instantiation does not imply identity of being.

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QUESTION II

Whether an ecclesiastical office can cease to exist without the extinction of the person who held it.

 

Objection 1
It seems that an ecclesiastical office cannot cease without the extinction of the person, because the office exists only insofar as it is exercised by a living subject. Therefore, if the person remains, the office must remain.

 

Objection 2
Further, supreme ecclesiastical offices are not ordinary offices but singular and perpetual in dignity. Therefore, it appears unfitting that such an office could cease while its holder remains alive.

 

Objection 3
Further, if an office could cease while the person remains, authority would be separated from its subject, producing juridical incoherence. Therefore, office-cessation without personal extinction should be considered impossible.

 

On the Contrary

Canon law explicitly provides that the Roman Pontiff may renounce his munus freely and duly manifested, without acceptance (c. 332 §2). Such renunciation effects the cessation of the office while the person remains alive. Therefore, an ecclesiastical office can cease without extinction of the person.

 

I Respond that

It must be said that an ecclesiastical office can and does cease without the extinction of the person, according to the very structure of canon law.

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For an office is not constituted by the mere existence of a person, but by juridical conferral. Likewise, it does not cease by the mere persistence of the person, but by juridical termination as defined by law. The being of an office is therefore governed by juridical causes, not by biological ones.

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The person, by contrast, exists by nature and persists until death. The law neither creates the person nor destroys him. Instead, the law regulates the relation between person and office, determining when that relation begins and ends.

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Accordingly, when the law provides a mode by which an office may be relinquished—whether by resignation, removal, transfer, or expiration—it effects the cessation of the office as a juridical reality, even though the person remains fully existent and capable of bearing other juridical statuses.

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This is especially clear in the case of papal renunciation. The law does not treat resignation as a metaphor, nor as a partial holding of office, but as a true juridical act that terminates the office itself. The continued existence of the resigning Pontiff as a living person does not preserve the office, because the formal cause of the office—juridical conferral—has been removed by juridical act.

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Therefore, the persistence of the person after resignation does not entail the persistence of the office, but rather establishes a new juridical state of the same person, now without that office.

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This distinction is not accidental but necessary for the coherence of canon law. Without it, no office could ever be resigned, and all juridical regulation of office-holding would collapse into biological determinism. Canon law avoids this absurdity by distinguishing clearly between cessation of office and extinction of person.

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Hence, an ecclesiastical office can cease while the person remains.

 

Reply to Objection 1

To the first objection it must be said that an office exists not because it is exercised, but because it is juridically constituted. Exercise presupposes office; it does not create it. Therefore, the continued existence of the person does not preserve the office once the juridical bond has been terminated.

 

Reply to Objection 2

To the second objection it must be said that the dignity or singularity of an office does not alter its juridical nature. Even the highest ecclesiastical office remains an office constituted and terminated by law. The law’s provision for papal renunciation confirms, rather than denies, this principle.

 

Reply to Objection 3

To the third objection it must be said that authority is not separated from its subject incoherently, but is removed juridically. Authority exists only where office exists. When the office ceases, authority ceases with it, while the person remains. This preserves, rather than destroys, juridical coherence.

 

 

PART II: ON VACANCY

 

QUESTION III

Whether “vacancy” in canon law is a univocal juridical condition or an analogical one.

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Objection 1
It seems that vacancy is a univocal juridical condition, because canon law frequently speaks simply of a “vacant see” (sede vacante) without qualification. Therefore, vacancy appears to have one determinate juridical meaning.

 

Objection 2
Further, vacancy is commonly understood as the absence of an officeholder. But absence is a simple fact admitting of no degrees or modes. Therefore, vacancy should be treated as univocal.

 

Objection 3
Further, if vacancy were analogical, juridical certainty would be undermined, since the same term would produce different legal effects. But law requires determinacy, not analogy. Therefore, vacancy must be univocal.

 

On the Contrary

Canon law itself distinguishes between multiple juridical situations described as “vacant,” including vacancy by death, vacancy by resignation, and vacancy with impediment, and attaches distinct legal effects to each (c. 335). Therefore, vacancy cannot be a univocal juridical condition.

 

I Respond that

It must be said that vacancy in canon law is an analogical juridical concept, not a univocal one.

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For a term is univocal when it signifies the same juridical reality in every instance, producing the same legal effects wherever it is applied. By contrast, a term is analogical when it signifies a common notion whose concrete juridical effects are determined by the nature of the subject and the governing law.

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Vacancy signifies, in a general sense, the absence of a personal holder from an office or juridical subject. But canon law does not treat that absence as self-interpreting. Rather, it treats vacancy as a juridical predicate whose operative meaning depends on:​ the juridical object said to be vacant, and the juridical state constituted by that vacancy under law.

 

Thus, the same descriptive term, vacatio, is applied to:​ an episcopal see vacated by resignation, an episcopal see vacated by death, the Roman See when impeded, the Apostolic See during an interregnum, yet the law explicitly attaches different norms, competences, and prohibitions to each.

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This diversity of legal effects cannot be explained if vacancy were univocal. If vacancy meant the same juridical thing in every case, it would produce the same juridical consequences. That it does not do so demonstrates that vacancy functions analogically within the legal system.

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Moreover, law does not lose determinacy by employing analogy. On the contrary, determinacy is preserved precisely by specifying which legal regime applies to which kind of vacancy. The determinacy lies not in the bare term “vacant,” but in the positive law that governs the vacancy in question.

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Thus, vacancy is not a self-executing juridical fact. It is a juridical condition whose effects arise only as defined by law. To treat vacancy as univocal would be to detach legal effects from legal causes and to substitute intuition for juridical structure.

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Therefore, vacancy must be understood as an analogical juridical concept.

 

Reply to Objection 1

To the first objection it must be said that the law’s use of a common term does not imply univocity of juridical effect. Legal language often employs general terms whose specific meaning is fixed by context and governing norms. The phrase sede vacante functions as a descriptive marker, not as a complete juridical definition.

 

Reply to Objection 2

To the second objection it must be said that absence as a physical or factual condition is indeed simple, but vacancy in law is not a merely factual absence. It is a juridically constituted state. Law does not respond to facts as such, but to facts as juridically qualified.

 

Reply to Objection 3

To the third objection it must be said that juridical certainty does not require univocity of terms, but clarity of norms. Canon law achieves certainty not by flattening vacancy into a single meaning, but by attaching determinate legal effects to determinate vacancy states.

 

QUESTION IV

Whether vacancy of the Roman See and of the Apostolic See are the same juridical reality in canon law.

 

Objection 1
It seems that vacancy of the Roman See and vacancy of the Apostolic See are the same, because the Roman Pontiff is the head of the Apostolic See. Therefore, when the Roman See is vacant, the Apostolic See must also be vacant in the same sense.

 

Objection 2
Further, common canonical usage speaks of Sede Apostolica vacante whenever there is no reigning Pope. Therefore, it appears that the vacancy of the Roman See and the vacancy of the Apostolic See are juridically identical.

 

Objection 3
Further, to distinguish these vacancies would multiply juridical entities without necessity and introduce confusion into the law. But law favors simplicity and unity. Therefore, the two vacancies should be treated as the same.

 

On the Contrary

Canon law itself defines the Roman See as an episcopal office (c. 331) and defines the Apostolic See as a composite juridical subject comprising multiple offices and institutions (c. 361). But that which is juridically distinct in definition cannot be identical in vacancy. Therefore, vacancy of the Roman See and vacancy of the Apostolic See are not the same juridical reality.

 

I Respond that

It must be said that vacancy of the Roman See and vacancy of the Apostolic See are not identical juridical realities, even though they are closely related.

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For vacancy follows the nature of the juridical object vacated. Where the juridical objects are distinct, the vacancy that affects them cannot be presumed identical either in kind or in effect.

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The Roman See is a personal ecclesiastical office, namely the episcopal see of the Bishop of Rome. Its vacancy arises when that office lacks a personal holder, whether by death, resignation, or other juridically recognized causes.

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The Apostolic See, by contrast, is a composite juridical subject, constituted by the Roman Pontiff together with the offices and institutions through which supreme governance of the Church is exercised. Its juridical existence is therefore not exhausted by the presence or absence of a single officeholder, but depends on the juridical configuration of that composite subject as a whole.

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Accordingly, when the Roman See is vacated, the Apostolic See is deprived of its head. This produces a real and juridically significant condition. However, the law does not treat this deprivation as automatically identical, in every juridically relevant sense, with the full vacancy of the Apostolic See as a juridical subject (cf. PB 6, UDG 14). Instead, canon law recognizes multiple juridical states in which the Apostolic See may exist without a reigning Pontiff, each governed by distinct norms.

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This is confirmed by canon 335, which distinguishes between vacancy and impediment and commands restraint (nihil innovetur) while deferring operative consequences to special law. Such a provision would be unintelligible if all vacancy states were juridically identical. The very fact that the law regulates different consequences for different vacancy conditions demonstrates that the vacancies are not the same in law.

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Therefore, while vacancy of the Roman See is a necessary condition for vacancy of the Apostolic See in any sense, it is not a sufficient condition to establish every juridically relevant form of Apostolic See vacancy. The two must be distinguished if canon law is to remain coherent.

 

Reply to Objection 1

To the first objection it must be said that although the Roman Pontiff is the head of the Apostolic See, the loss of a head does not dissolve a composite juridical subject in the same way as the loss of a holder dissolves a personal office. Headship and juridical identity are not coextensive.

 

Reply to Objection 2

To the second objection it must be said that common canonical usage employs shorthand expressions that presuppose context. Such usage does not override formal juridical definitions. Law often uses a common phrase to refer to multiple juridical states; the precise meaning of the phrase must be determined by the governing norms.

 

Reply to Objection 3

To the third objection it must be said that juridical clarity is not achieved by collapsing distinctions but by respecting those distinctions that the law itself establishes. Confusion arises not from distinguishing realities, but from treating distinct juridical objects as if they were the same.

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PART III: ON COMPETENCE

 

QUESTION V

Whether constitutive juridical competence can arise from necessity, presupposition, or the effects of an act.

 

Objection 1
It seems that constitutive competence can arise from necessity, because the Church must always have a supreme pastor. Therefore, where necessity demands it, competence to act must be presumed.

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Objection 2
Further, where the law presupposes that an act will occur, it seems to presuppose the competence required for that act. Therefore, presupposition in law can generate constitutive competence.

 

Objection 3
Further, if an act produces effects that are received and acted upon by the Church, this reception appears to confirm the competence of the actor. Therefore, competence can arise from the effect of an act.

 

On the Contrary

Canon law explicitly distinguishes between valid acts and null acts and provides that where constitutive conditions are not observed, the act is null and produces no juridical effect (c. 10). But that which is null cannot generate its own competence by necessity, presupposition, or effect. Therefore, constitutive competence cannot arise from any of these.

 

I Respond that

It must be said that constitutive juridical competence cannot arise from necessity, presupposition, or effect, but only from positive conferral by law.

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For constitutive competence is the formal cause by which a juridical reality (such as an office, right, or authority) comes into existence. As a formal cause, it must precede the act and be present at the moment of its attempted exercise. That which comes after the act, or is inferred from its desirability or outcome, cannot function as a constitutive cause.

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Necessity pertains to circumstance, not to form. It may explain why an act is desired, but it cannot supply the juridical authority to perform that act. To allow necessity to generate competence would be to replace law with expediency and to convert juridical order into functional improvisation.

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Presupposition likewise cannot generate competence. Law may regulate how an act is to be carried out once competence exists, but it does not thereby create the competence it presupposes. Presupposition describes a conditional framework; it does not confer the authority required to enter that framework.

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Nor can competence arise from effect. Juridical effects presuppose a valid act performed by a competent subject. Where competence is lacking, the act is null and produces no juridical effect. To argue that effects generate competence is therefore circular: it assumes the validity it seeks to prove.

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Canon law codifies this structure explicitly by means of invalidating law (lex irritans). Where the law declares that an act performed without required conditions is null, it thereby denies that any subsequent acceptance, reception, or utility can supply what was lacking at the moment of action.

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Hence, constitutive competence must be positively conferred prior to the act, by the authority competent to confer it. Where the law withholds such conferral, competence does not arise, no matter how pressing the necessity, how strong the presupposition, or how extensive the apparent effects.

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Therefore, constitutive competence arises only from law, and from law alone.

 

Reply to Objection 1

To the first objection it must be said that the necessity of the Church having a pastor is a theological truth, not a juridical mechanism. Canon law governs how authority is lawfully exercised, not how necessity is satisfied by any available means. Necessity explains the gravity of a situation; it does not generate competence.

 

Reply to Objection 2

To the second objection it must be said that legal presupposition regulates the exercise of an authority already conferred. It does not create that authority. To confuse presupposition with conferral is to mistake condition for cause.

 

Reply to Objection 3

To the third objection it must be said that reception or effect can confirm the exercise of an already-existing authority, but it cannot generate authority where none existed. A null act remains null regardless of how many consequences follow from it in fact.

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QUESTION VI

Whether invalidating law closes the field of juridical competence.

 

Objection 1
It seems that invalidating law does not close the field of competence, because law must be interpreted to allow its own functioning. Therefore, where strict application would prevent action, competence should be presumed rather than withheld.

 

Objection 2
Further, canon law provides for interpretation, equity, and supplied jurisdiction in cases of doubt or common error. Therefore, even where an invalidating norm exists, competence should be capable of being supplied.

 

Objection 3
Further, to say that invalidating law closes the field of competence would imply that the legal system can reach a point of paralysis. But law exists to govern action, not to prevent it. Therefore, invalidating law cannot be understood as closing competence absolutely.

 

On the Contrary

Canon law explicitly provides that only those laws are invalidating which expressly establish that an act is null or that a person is incapable of performing an act (c. 10). But where the law expressly declares an act null, it thereby denies the juridical existence of that act. Therefore, no competence exists outside what the law has expressly permitted.

 

I Respond that

It must be said that invalidating law closes the field of juridical competence.

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For invalidating law (lex irritans) does not merely regulate the manner in which an act is to be performed; it determines whether the act can exist at all in law. Where such a law applies, the juridical field is not open-ended but strictly delimited by the conditions laid down.

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Competence is not a natural capacity but a juridical one. It exists only where the law has constituted it. When an invalidating norm declares that an act performed without certain conditions is null, the law is not inviting supplementation by interpretation or equity; it is withholding juridical being from any act attempted outside those conditions.

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Thus, silence in a field governed by invalidating law does not signify discretion. It signifies exclusion. What the law has not authorized, it has withheld. To act beyond those limits is not to act defectively, but to act without juridical existence.

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This structure is essential to law as law. Without invalidating norms, competence would be elastic and authority would become a function of circumstance, ingenuity, or acceptance. By contrast, invalidating law marks the boundary at which juridical reason refuses to constitute authority rather than permit its fabrication.

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Nor does this entail paralysis in an irrational sense. A legal system may rationally withhold authorization in anomalous circumstances rather than license acts for which it has not provided competence. Such restraint is not a failure of law but an expression of its fidelity to reason and form.

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Therefore, where invalidating law governs, the field of competence is closed, and no act attempted outside the conditions laid down can acquire juridical existence.

 

Reply to Objection 1

To the first objection it must be said that law functions precisely by determining when action is permitted and when it is not. To presume competence in order to keep the system moving is to abandon law in favor of management. Law may rationally refuse to function where functioning would require the invention of authority.

 

Reply to Objection 2

To the second objection it must be said that interpretation, equity, and supplied jurisdiction operate only where the law already grants competence and the question concerns its exercise. They do not operate where the law has expressly denied juridical existence to an act. Lex irritans admits no supplementation.

 

Reply to Objection 3

To the third objection it must be said that the purpose of law is not uninterrupted action, but lawful action. Where lawful action is impossible without altering the constitutive conditions laid down by the legislator, law does not authorize improvisation. It bears witness to its own limits.

 

PART IV: ON SUCCESSION

 

QUESTION VII

Whether juridical succession always follows the vacancy of an ecclesiastical office.

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Objection 1
It seems that succession always follows vacancy, because an office exists for the sake of governance, and governance requires a holder. Therefore, whenever an office is vacant, succession must follow immediately.

 

Objection 2
Further, if succession did not follow vacancy, the office would remain empty, which appears contrary to the good of the Church. Therefore, vacancy must entail succession.

 

Objection 3
Further, in the case of the highest office, namely the papacy, it seems inconceivable that vacancy could exist without succession, since the Church cannot be without a head. Therefore, succession must follow vacancy necessarily.

 

On the Contrary

Canon law itself distinguishes between vacancy and impediment and imposes conservation norms (nihil innovetur) during such states (c. 335). But conservation presupposes the absence of succession, at least for a time. Therefore, succession does not always follow vacancy.

 

I Respond that

It must be said that succession does not always follow vacancy of office, but follows only that vacancy which the law positively identifies as succession-triggering.

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For succession is not merely the filling of an empty position; it is a constitutive juridical act by which a new holder is brought into existence as the subject of an office. As such, succession requires not only the absence of a prior holder, but also the presence of juridical competence to replace that holder.

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Vacancy, by contrast, is a juridical condition describing the absence of a holder. As established above, vacancy is analogical and admits of multiple juridical states, each governed by distinct legal consequences. Some vacancy states are custodial, conservative, or restrained, as expressly required by canon 335 (nihil innovetur); others are death-conditioned and succession-necessitating. Which is which is not determined by the fact of vacancy alone, but by the law governing the office and the juridical state constituted by that vacancy.

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Accordingly, the law may provide that:​ certain vacancies require immediate succession, others require delay, others require restraint without succession, and others provide no succession mechanism at all unless further juridical conditions are met.

 

This is not a defect of law but an expression of its rational ordering. A legal system that treats every vacancy as automatically succession-triggering would collapse distinct juridical states into a single functional intuition and would erase the distinction between absence and authorization.

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Therefore, succession follows vacancy only when and because the law has provided for succession in that vacancy state. Where the law has not done so, succession does not arise by implication, necessity, or expectation.

Hence, succession does not always follow vacancy of office.

 

Reply to Objection 1

To the first objection it must be said that governance explains why succession is desirable, not why it is juridically authorized. Law governs not what is desirable in the abstract, but what is permitted according to form.

 

Reply to Objection 2

To the second objection it must be said that the good of the Church is preserved not only by continuity of office, but by fidelity to lawful authority. An unlawful succession harms the common good more deeply than a restrained vacancy.

 

Reply to Objection 3

To the third objection it must be said that the Church’s inability to be without a head is a theological truth, not a juridical shortcut. Canon law regulates the lawful constitution of authority, not the metaphysical guarantees of providence.

 

 

PART V: ON THE RULE OF INTERPRETATION

 

QUESTION VIII

How special law governing papal election must be understood in light of the juridical ontology.

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Objection 1
It seems that special election law should be interpreted functionally, because its purpose is to ensure the continuity of the papacy. Therefore, ambiguous provisions should be read in whatever way allows an election to occur.

 

Objection 2
Further, special law is enacted precisely to deal with exceptional circumstances. Therefore, it should be interpreted flexibly, even if this requires extending its provisions by implication.

 

Objection 3
Further, if special election law were interpreted strictly according to prior ontology, it could fail to apply in unforeseen situations. But the legislator cannot be presumed to have intended legal deadlock. Therefore, ontology must yield to operative necessity.

 

On the Contrary

Canon law itself provides that laws which establish conditions of validity and restrict the free exercise of rights are subject to strict interpretation (c. 18). Moreover, where a law establishes nullity (lex irritans), its conditions delimit competence rather than invite supplementation. Therefore, special election law must be interpreted in conformity with, not in derogation from, the juridical ontology that makes law possible as law.

 

I Respond that

It must be said that special election law must be interpreted as constitutive law operating within a closed juridical field, governed by the prior ontology of office, vacancy, competence, and succession.

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For special law does not create a new juridical universe. It presupposes the juridical realities to which it applies. An election law presupposes:​ an office capable of succession, a vacancy of the type that necessitates succession, a subject competent to act, and conditions under which that competence is instantiated.

 

These presuppositions are not supplied by the election law itself unless expressly stated. They are furnished by the general juridical ontology of canon law already established.

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Thus, special election law cannot be interpreted as if:​ vacancy were univocal, succession were automatic, competence could be presumed, or silence could be treated as authorization.

 

Rather, where special law governs a constitutive act and declares nullity for non-compliance, it must be read as exhaustive rather than illustrative. Its conditions define the limits of juridical being, not merely the preferred manner of acting.

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Nor may special law be extended by implication to cover cases it does not positively regulate. Canon 19 governs interpretation where law exists; it does not constitute juridical being nor confer competence where none has been positively granted. In a closed field governed by lex irritans, extension by analogy or necessity would fabricate competence rather than apply law. The law’s failure to provide for a contingency is not a gap inviting repair; it is a boundary marking where authority has not been conferred.

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This does not attribute irrationality to the legislator. A rational legislator may choose restraint over improvisation, preferring Custodial Status of the Apostolic See to unauthorized succession. Law remains law even when it withholds solutions.

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Therefore, special election law must be interpreted:​ strictly, because it conditions validity; ontologically, because it presupposes juridical realities it does not redefine; non-functionally, because necessity cannot supply competence; non-creatively, because silence withholds authority.

 

Hence, any reading of special election law that requires collapsing ontological distinctions or importing unwritten exceptions ceases to be interpretation and becomes legislation.

 

Reply to Objection 1

To the first objection it must be said that continuity of office explains the purpose of election law, not its mode of operation. Law does not guarantee outcomes; it governs lawful means.

 

Reply to Objection 2

To the second objection it must be said that special law is exceptional in subject matter, not elastic in form. Its exceptional character heightens, rather than relaxes, the requirement of strict interpretation.

 

Reply to Objection 3

To the third objection it must be said that presumed legislative intent cannot override promulgated conditions of validity. Where the law withholds competence, fidelity consists in recognizing that withholding, not in inventing authority to avoid inconvenience.

 

 

INTERPOSED SYNTHESIS: THE ONTOLOGY OF VACANCY, COMPETENCE, AND SUCCESSION

 

I. On Office and Person

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The papacy is an ecclesiastical office (munus), not a personal attribute.​ The office is a juridical being constituted and terminated by law. The person of the Roman Pontiff persists across multiple juridical states and is not identical with the office he holds.

 

II. On Vacancy

 

An office may cease without extinction of the person.​ Vacancy is not a univocal juridical condition but an analogical concept whose legal effects depend on: the juridical object vacated, and the juridical state thereby constituted.

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The Roman See and the Apostolic See are distinct juridical objects and therefore admit distinct vacancy states.

Vacancy of the Roman See does not, by itself, determine the juridical state of the Apostolic See for every juridically operative consequence defined by special law.

 

III. On Competence

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Constitutive competence is the formal juridical cause of offices, authority, and succession.​​ Constitutive competence:​ cannot arise from necessity, cannot be presumed from context, cannot be inferred from effects or acceptance.

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Where invalidating law (lex irritans) governs, the juridical field is closed:​ what is not expressly conferred is withheld; silence signifies exclusion, not discretion.

 

IV. On Succession

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Succession is a constitutive act, not a functional response to absence.​​ Succession does not follow vacancy as such, but only that vacancy which the law positively identifies as succession-triggering. Some vacancy states are custodial and conservative, governed by restraint (nihil innovetur), and do not authorize succession.

 

V. On the Special Election Law

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Special election law presupposes this ontology; it does not redefine it.

 

Because election law governs a constitutive act under invalidating norms, it must be interpreted:​ strictly, exhaustively, non-functionally, without extension by implication.

 

Where special law does not positively instantiate competence, no subject may supply it by interpretation, equity, necessity, or reception.

 

Conclusion

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Law remains law even when it withholds solutions. Authority exists only where it has been constituted. Fidelity consists not in preserving outcomes, but in refusing to fabricate causes.

 

PART VI: APPLICATION TO THE LAW OF PAPAL ELECTION

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With these principles established, we now apply them to the special law governing papal elections.

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QUESTION IX

Whether the special law governing the election of the Roman Pontiff instantiates electoral competence only in the case of death.

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Objection 1
It seems that the special election law instantiates competence in every case of vacancy, because it speaks broadly of the vacancy of the Apostolic See. Therefore, competence should arise whenever the See is vacant, regardless of cause.

 

Objection 2
Further, the special law explicitly acknowledges the possibility of papal resignation. Therefore, it must be understood to attach the same electoral competence to resignation as it does to death.

 

Objection 3
Further, if the special law instantiated competence only in the case of death, it would fail to provide for resignation-induced vacancy. But the legislator cannot be presumed to have enacted an incomplete election law. Therefore, competence must arise in both cases.

 

Objection 4

It seems that UDG 77’s "ea omnia servanda esse declaramus" plus reference to c. 332 §2 is a positive bridge conferring applicability and thus competence in resignation.

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On the Contrary

The special election law consistently predicates the activation of the electoral regime upon the death of the Roman Pontiff, and declares null any election conducted otherwise than under the conditions it prescribes. Where a law governing a constitutive act conditions its operation upon a specific juridical state, that conditioning limits the existence of competence itself.

 

I Respond that

It must be said that the special law governing papal election instantiates electoral competence only in the case of death, and does not positively instantiate such competence in the case of resignation.

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For the law governing papal election is special, constitutive, and invalidating. It does not regulate a standing power; it brings electoral competence into existence upon the occurrence of a legally-defined condition. Such competence cannot be presumed or inferred; it must be positively instantiated.

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The juridical structure of the special law is consistent and determinate. Throughout its dispositive provisions, the activation of the interregnum, the cessation of papal governance, the convening of the College of Cardinals, and the exercise of the ius eligendi are all attached to a death-conditioned vacancy of the Apostolic See. These are not narrative flourishes, but juridical predicates identifying the state in which competence arises.

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Where the law acknowledges resignation, it does so conditionally and regulatorily, not constitutively. Acknowledgment of a factual possibility does not itself define the juridical effects of that possibility. In a closed field governed by invalidating norms, such acknowledgment cannot substitute for the positive conferral of competence required to bring an election into juridical existence.

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Nor does the absence of a resignation-trigger imply a defect in the law. As established above, succession does not follow vacancy as such, but only that vacancy which the law identifies as succession-triggering. A rational legislator may provide for restraint rather than succession in certain vacancy states, preferring Custodial Status of the Apostolic See to unauthorized continuity.

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Hence, where the special law fails to identify resignation as a juridical trigger equivalent to death for purposes of election, no electoral competence arises. Any attempted election conducted in the absence of such competence lacks constitutive authority and falls under the law’s own invalidating provision.

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Therefore, the special election law instantiates electoral competence only in the case of death.

 

Reply to Objection 1

To the first objection it must be said that reference to vacancy in general does not override the law’s specific conditioning of competence. Vacancy names a juridical condition; competence arises only where the law positively attaches it to that condition.

 

Reply to Objection 2

To the second objection it must be said that acknowledgment of resignation does not equate resignation with death juridically. In constitutive law, acknowledgment without conferral produces no authority.

 

Reply to Objection 3

To the third objection it must be said that the completeness of law does not require it to provide a solution for every contingency. Law may rationally withhold succession mechanisms where it has not conferred competence. Such withholding is fidelity to juridical form, not legislative failure.

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Reply to Objection 4

I respond to the fourth objection by making a distinction.

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It is conceded that Universi Dominici Gregis no. 77 employs a formula of positive law, namely the verb declaramus, and that it expressly refers to the case of the resignation of the Supreme Pontiff, in accordance with canon 332 §2 of the Code of Canon Law.

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It is denied, however, that from this there follows any positive conferral of the power to elect or of the right of succession upon the College of Cardinals.

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The reason is that the object of the legislative act in UDG 77 is not the conferral of competence, but rather a command of observance: that the same dispositions be arranged and observed concerning all matters which precede the election of the Roman Pontiff and pertain to the election itself.

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The formula “to be observed” (servanda esse) prescribes a manner of acting; it does not constitute a faculty to act. In canon law, constitutive competence for a juridical act subject to invalidation does not arise from a procedural mandate, but only from a positive norm conferring power, which employs proper terms such as the right belongs, power is given, or a faculty is granted.

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No such term is present in UDG 77.

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The fact that the same number refers to canon 332 §2 signifies only that a resignation, if valid, can constitute a state of vacancy; it does not signify that such a resignation, either of itself or by means of UDG 77, confers competence for the act of succession.

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A referral to a norm defining a fact or state is not the conferral of power for a juridical act that may follow from that state.

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Hence, it is clear that UDG 77 is an applicative and procedural norm, not a constitutive norm of competence.

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If the special law governing the election of the Roman Pontiff had intended to confer competence in the case of resignation, it would have had to do so expressly, especially in a field closed by invalidating law.

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Therefore the objection fails, and UDG 77 does not suffice to constitute electoral competence in the case of vacancy by resignation.

 

GENERAL CONCLUSION

 

On Vacancy of the Apostolic See and the Defect of Electoral Competence

 

From the foregoing, the following conclusions are established according to canon law as law, and not by appeal to theology, intention, consensus, or outcome.

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1. The papacy is an ecclesiastical office (munus), juridically distinct from the person who holds it, constituted and terminated by law.

 

2. An ecclesiastical office may cease without extinction of the person, and such cessation places the person into a new juridical state without the office formerly held.

 

3. Vacancy is not a univocal juridical condition but an analogical concept, whose legal effects depend upon: the object vacated, and the state constituted by that vacancy under law.

 

4. The Roman See and the Apostolic See are distinct juridical objects and therefore admit distinct vacancy states with non-identical legal consequences.

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5. Succession is a constitutive juridical act, not an automatic consequence of vacancy, and arises only where the law positively identifies a vacancy state as succession-triggering.

 

6. Constitutive competence is the formal cause of succession and cannot arise from:​ necessity, presupposition, interpretation, or subsequent acceptance.

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7. Where invalidating law (lex irritans) governs a constitutive act, the juridical field is closed: what the law does not expressly confer is withheld, and silence signifies exclusion rather than discretion.

 

8. The special law governing papal elections is constitutive, exclusive, and invalidating, and must therefore be interpreted strictly and exhaustively, in conformity with the juridical ontology it presupposes.

 

9. That special law positively instantiates electoral competence only in the case of a death-conditioned vacancy of the Apostolic See, and does not positively instantiate such competence in the case of vacancy arising from resignation.

 

10. Where electoral competence is not instantiated by law, no subject is authorized to elect, and any attempted election conducted under such conditions is juridically null and void, conferring no right.

 

Conclusion

 

Therefore, where the vacancy of the Apostolic See has not occurred in the juridical form presupposed by the special election law, electoral competence does not arise. Where electoral competence does not arise, succession cannot lawfully occur. Where succession does not lawfully occur, no papal office is constituted.

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This conclusion follows necessarily from the structure of canon law itself. It neither asserts doctrinal error nor imputes personal fault. It testifies only to the limits of juridical authority as defined by law.

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Law remains law even when it withholds solutions. Authority exists only where it has been constituted. Fidelity consists not in preserving outcomes, but in refusing to fabricate causes.

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Corollary: On the Purported Papal Election of 2025

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From the foregoing it follows necessarily that the defect established in the election of 2013 was not accidental or procedural, but constitutive. Where constitutive competence is absent, no papal authority is acquired, nor can such authority be presupposed, supplied, or healed by subsequent acts.

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The creation of Cardinals is an act proper to a true Roman Pontiff. If no papal authority was obtained in 2013, then the purported creation of Cardinals thereafter was juridically null and conferred no ius eligendi.

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The College of Cardinals is a juridical subject constituted by law, not a numerical aggregate capable of acting through a valid remainder. Where the body lacks lawful constitution, it lacks competence to elect.

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Therefore, the conclave of 2025, insofar as it depended upon authority derived from a null election and upon an electing subject juridically defective, lacked constitutive competence. By force of invalidating law (lex irritans), such an election is null ipso iure and confers no right upon the one designated.

 

EPILOGUE: ON THE CUSTODIAL STATUS OF THE APOSTOLIC SEE

 

The conclusion reached in this work does not arise from hostility to the Church, nor from skepticism toward her divine constitution. It arises from fidelity to canon law as law, according to its own nature, limits, and structure.

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Canon law is not a machine guaranteed to produce outcomes in every conceivable contingency. It is a juridical order constituted by reason, competence, and promulgation. Where those elements are present, authority exists and binds. Where they are absent, authority does not arise, even if the resulting situation is uncomfortable, prolonged, or unresolved.

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This condition is properly described as the Custodial Status of the Apostolic See.

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The Custodial Status of the Apostolic See does not mean chaos, anarchy, or the collapse of ecclesial life. It means something more precise and more austere: that the law has reached a point at which it withholds authorization rather than fabricate it. In such cases, the law does not fail; it testifies to its own integrity. It refuses to convert necessity into competence, desire into jurisdiction, or acceptance into constitutive cause.

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Historically, the Church has known such moments. Antipopes have not arisen because the law was unclear, but because it was disregarded or overridden. The present analysis does not assert malice, conspiracy, or doctrinal corruption. It asserts only that law binds according to its terms, and that when those terms are not satisfied, the resulting defect cannot be healed by ingenuity or good intentions.

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Nor does Custodial Status of the Apostolic See imply that the Church is abandoned by providence. Divine governance does not depend upon juridical shortcuts. The Church’s indefectibility is a theological promise, not a license to alter the conditions of lawful authority. Canon law governs the visible constitution of authority; it does not guarantee uninterrupted institutional functionality under every circumstance.

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Fidelity, in such a situation, consists not in improvisation but in restraint.

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To recognize the absence of juridical competence is not rebellion. It is obedience to the form of law as promulgated. To refuse to manufacture authority where none has been conferred is not despair. It is confidence that truth does not depend upon outcomes, and that the Church is sustained by God, not by legal fictions.

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Accordingly, this work does not propose a solution. It proposes a judgment.

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That judgment is limited, juridical, and exact: where the law has not conferred authority, no authority exists. To act otherwise would not resolve the crisis, but deepen it by replacing law with will.

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Sometimes fidelity requires action. Sometimes fidelity requires waiting. In Custodial Status of the Apostolic See, fidelity requires recognition.

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​That the law withholds competence in certain states does not imply perpetual paralysis. The conditions under which the custodial status may lawfully terminate are treated in the document called Conclave.

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